Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
War Crimes Memoranda

War Crimes

2004

Whether The Referrals to The ICC By Uganda and The Democratic
Republic of Congo Violate the Principle of Complementarity
Andrea Telloni

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Telloni, Andrea, "Whether The Referrals to The ICC By Uganda and The Democratic Republic of Congo
Violate the Principle of Complementarity" (2004). War Crimes Memoranda. 195.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos/195

This Memo is brought to you for free and open access by the War Crimes at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War Crimes Memoranda by an authorized
administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

ISSUE: WHETHER THE REFERRALS TO THE ICC BY UGANDA AND THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF
COMPLEMENTARITY

Prepared by Andrea Telloni
Fall 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
B. Summary of Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1. It Is Unlikely that the Interests of Justice would be Served if the ICC
Does Not Prosecute the Cases Referred to It By Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. There Is a Sound Argument that the Cases Referred to the
International Criminal Court by Uganda and by the Democratic
Republic of Congo Do Not Violate the Principle of
Complementarity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. The Situation in Uganda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. The Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III. THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
A. The Rome Statute’s Rules of Jurisdiction and Admissibility. . . . . . . . . . . 8
B. The International Criminal Court as a Court of Last Resort. . . . . . . . . . 12
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
A. Development and Definition of the Principle of
Complementarity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
B. The Rome Statute’s Incorporation of the Principle of
Complementarity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
1. Article 17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C. Violation of the Principle of Complementarity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
1. Contemplated Violations of the Principle of
Complementarity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

i

2. Concerns of States Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
3. Purpose of the Principle of Complementarity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
V. THE CONCEPT OF WAIVER BY A STATE PARTY OF THE
REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLEMENTARITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
A. The Rome Statute’s Silence on the Use of Waiver by States
Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B. The Duty of Nations to Prosecute under International Law. . . . . . . . . . . 33
C. The Acceptability of Waiver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
D. The Consequences of Waiver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
VI. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
UN RESOLUTIONS AND DOCUMENTS
1. UN Doc. A/49/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Forty-sixth Session, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with commentaries,
2 May – 22 July, 1994 (G.A., 49th Sess., Supp. No 10., 1994).
2. UN Doc. A/50/22, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (G.A., 50th Sess., Supp. No 22, 1995), reprinted in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 617 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
3. UN Doc. A/51/10, Report of the International Law Commission on its Forty-Eighth
Session, 6 May to 26 July 1996 (G.A., 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, 1996).
4. UN Doc. A/51/22, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Volume I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee
during March-April and August 1996), reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 385 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
5. UN Doc. A/51/22, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Volume II (Compilation of proposals), reprinted in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 441 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
6. UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5, 1997 Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at
its Session held in New York 11 to 21 February 1997, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 369 (M. Cherif Bassiouni,
ed., 1998)
7. UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1, 1997 Decisions Taken by the Preparatory
Committee at its Session held in New York 4 to 15 August 1997, reprinted in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 349 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
8. UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1, 1997 Decisions Taken by the Preparatory
Committee at its Session held in New York 1 to 12 December 1997, reprinted in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 313 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
9. UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 1998) Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19
to 30 January 1998 held in Zutphen, The Netherlands, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 221 (M. Cherif Bassiouni,
ed., 1998)

iii

10. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2 (1998) Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Introduction & Draft Organization of
Work , reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 115 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
11. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Statute and
Draft Final Act, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 119 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
12. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.2 (1998) Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Rules of Procedure , reprinted in
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 211
(M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
13. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998), Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. Available at www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
14. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (17 July 1998), Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.
15. UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (13-31 March 2000, 12-30 June 2000), Report of
the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Part I: Finalized draft
text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/jun2000/5thdocs.htm.
TREATISES AND BOOKS
16. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE : THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000)
17. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI AND EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY
TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995)
18. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987)
19. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003)
20. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE (2002)
21. BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003)
22. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003)

iv

23. ANTONIO CASSESE, PAOLA GAETA, & JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY (2002)
24. HERMAN A.M. VON HEBEL, JOHAN G. LAMMERS AND JOLIEN SCHUKKING, EDS.,
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ADRIAN
BOS (1999)
25. THORDIS INGADOTTIR, ED., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICY AND PRACTICE – FINANCING, VICTIMS, JUDGES, AND
IMMUNITIES (2003)
26. YOUNG SOK KIM, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY TO THE
ROME STATUTE 243 (2003)
27. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, SURRENDERING TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS: CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES (2002)
28. ROY S. LEE, ET AL., EDS., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (2001)
29. ROY S. LEE, ED., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE, ISSUES NEGOTIATIONS RESULTS (1999)
30. JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: VERSAILLES TO ROME (2003)
31. GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, OLIVIA SWAAK-GOLDMAN, EDS., SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS, VOLUME I (2000)
32. KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT,
COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION (2000)
33. MAURO POLITI AND GIUSEPPE NESI, EDS., THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC: A
CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY (2002)
34. LEILA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2002)
35. PHILIPPE SANDS, FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2003)
36. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(2003)

v

37. SARAH B. SEWALL & CARL KAYSEN EDS., THE UNITED STATES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2000)
38. DINAH SHELTON, ED., INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2000)
39. LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (1997)
JOURNALS AN D LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
40. Scott W. Andreasen, The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution
Preclude its Ratification by the United States?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 697, 723 (2000)
41. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Developments in International Criminal Law: The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22 (1999).
42. Jeffrey L. Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. POL’Y 281 (1997)
43. Adam Branch, International Justice, Local Injustice: The International Criminal
Court in Northern Uganda, DISSENT, Summer 2004, at 22, available at
http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=aph&a
n=13796694.
44. Bruce Broomhall, The International Criminal Court: Overview, and Cooperation
with States, in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 13
NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 45, 66 (1999)
45. Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383 (1998)
46. William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002)
Sands ed., 2003)
47. Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and
Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 132 (2002)
48. John M. Czarnetsky and Ronald J. Rychlak, An Empire or Law?: Legalism and the
International Criminal Court, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55 (2003)
49. Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510
(2003).

vi

50. Helen Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal
Court, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 5 (2001)
51. Colleen Enache-Brown and Ari Fried, Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty: The
Obligation of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in International Law, 43 MCGILL L.J. 613 (1998)
52. Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in
International Criminal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 802-09 (2003)
53. Giulio M. Gallarotti & Arik Y. Preis, Politics, International Justice, and the United
States: Toward a Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 ULCA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 1 (1999)
54. Tikkun A. S. Gottschalk, The Realpolitik of Empire, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y
281, 299-300 (2003)
55. Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an
International Criminal Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to
National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1 (2002)
56. Anne K. Heindel, International Human Rights & U.S. Foreign Policy: The
Counterproductive Bush Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal Court,
2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 345, 359 (2004)
57. Roy S. Lee, An Assessment of the ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 750, 757
(2002)
58. David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85 (2004)
59. Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167
MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001)
60. Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva Conventions: Disturbing Background to
the ICC Debate, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 169 (2003
61. Mark A. Summers, A Fresh Look at the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court: The Case for Scrapping the Treaty, 20 WIS. INT’L L. J. 57,
69-70 (2001).
62. Andrew J. Walker, When a Good Idea is Poorly Implemented: How the International
Court Fails to be Insulated from International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process
Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 245 (2004)
63. Leila Sadat Wexler, Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and
Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221 (1997)

vii

64. John R. Worth, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty:
Reconsidering the “Un-Signing” of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker,
79 IND. L. J. 245, 260-65 (2004)
65. Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to
Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869 (2002).
66. Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the
Complementarity Principle: An assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the ICC,
5 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW (forthcoming Feb. 2005)
67. Mohamed M. El Zeidy, Universal Jurisdiction In Absentia: Is it a Legal Valid Option
for Repressing Heinous Crimes?, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, vol. 37, no. 3 (Fall
2003)
NGO PUBLICATIONS
68. Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of the Congo: “Our brothers who help
kill us” – economic exploitation and human rights abuses in the east.”, 1 April 2003, AI
Index: AFR 62/010/2003, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR620102003
69. Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices
– Part I, London, January 1997, AI Index: IOR 40/001/1997, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400011997
70. Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices
– Part III, London, November 1997, AI Index: IOR 40/013/1997, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400131997
71. Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices
– Part V: Recommendations to the diplomatic conference, May 1998, AI Index: IOR
40/010/1998. (or 40/010/1998), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400101998
72. Amnesty International, Public Statement: Uganda: International Criminal Court
investigation an important step toward ending impunity, 29 July 2004, News Service No:
191, AI Index: AFR 59/006/2004, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR590062004
73. Amnesty International, Uganda Concerns about the International Criminal Court Bill
2004, 27 July 2004, AI Index: AFR 59/005/2004, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR590052004

viii

74. Coalition for the International Criminal Court’s Budget and Finance Team, The 2004
Programme Budget of the International Criminal Court and Report of the Committee on
Budget and Finance, submission to the second session of the Assembly of States Parties
(8-12 September 2003), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/asp/papersonaspissues/2ndASP/Budget_ASP_Paper_2
003.FINAL.pdf
75. Human Rights Watch, D.R. Congo: Ituri Court Must Prosecute Gravest Crimes –
Donors and DRC Authorities Should Increase Funding for Local Courts, Human Rights
News, 2 September 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/02/congo9291.htm
76. Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo: Briefing to the 60th Session of
the UN Committee on Human Rights, January 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/29/congo7128.htm
77. Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo Confronting Impunity,
Briefing Paper January 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/02/congo7230.htm
78. Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo – Ituri: “Covered in Blood” –
Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo, Vol. 15, No. 11 (A) – July
2003, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/DRC0703full.pdf
79. Human Rights Watch, ICC: Investigate All Sides in Uganda – Chance for Impartial
ICC Investigation into Serious Crimes a Welcome Step, February 4, 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/04/uganda7264_txt.htm
80. Human Rights Watch, ICC’s First-Ever Probe Must Be Effective – Criminal
Responsibility in Congo Conflict Reaches Across Borders, 23 June 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/23/congo8936_txt.htm
81. Human Rights Watch, Making Justice Work: Restoration of the Legal System in Ituri,
DRC, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Background Briefing, 2 September 2004,
available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/drc0904/index.htm.
82. Human Rights Watch, State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, March 2004, Vol. 16, No. 4
(A), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uganda0404/uganda0304.pdf
83. Human Rights Watch, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Uganda in Eastern DRC:
Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/drc/DRC0301.PDF
84. Human Rights Watch, Justice in the Balance: Recommendations for an Independent
and Effective International Criminal Court (1998)

ix

85. Human Rights Watch, Making the International Criminal Court Work: A Handbook
for Implementing the Rome Statute (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/handbook_e.pdf
UN PRESS RELEASES
86. UN Press Release GA/L/3011 of 31 October 1996, Comment by the representative of
Poland in the Sixth Committee
87. UN Press Release GA/L/3046 of 23 October 1997.
88. UN Press Release L/2771 of 1 April 1996.
89. UN Press Release L/2779 of 8 April 1996.
RESOLUTIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES
90. Resolution ICC-ASP/2/Res.1, Programme budget for 2004, Working Capital Fund
for 2004, scale of assessments for the apportionment of expenses of the International
Criminal Court and financing of appropriation for 2004, adopted at the 5th plenary
meeting, 12 September 2003, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/2ndsession/report/english/part_iv_res_1_e.pdf
91. Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.4, Programme budget for 2005, Contingency Fund,
Working Capital Fund for 2005, scale of assessments for the apportionment of expenses
of the International Criminal Court and financing of appropriations for the year 2005,
adopted at the 6th plenary meeting, 10 September 2004, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/statesparties/ICC-ASP-3-25-Part_III_English.pdf.
UNITED STATES SENATE HEARINGS
92. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearings on the
U.N. Int’l Criminal Court Before the Subcomm. On Int’l Operations of the Senate
Comm. On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (July 23, 1998) (Statement of Professor
Michael P. Scharf), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11sh105.html.

x

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues
The principle of complementarity, as set forth in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, provides that the International Criminal Court (ICC) may
claim jurisdiction only where a State is “unwilling” or “unable” to prosecute. In its
relationship to national courts, the ICC is therefore intended to be a court of last resort.
The countries of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo have, for political
reasons, referred directly to the ICC cases over which they have primary jurisdiction.
Their referrals raise the issue of whether these cases violate the principle of
complementarity.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. It Is Unlikely that the Interests of Justice would be Served if the ICC Does
Not Prosecute the Cases Referred to It By Uganda and the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
The interests of justice must be met in accordance with Rome Statute article
53(1), which states that, “[i]n deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor
shall consider whether:…(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”1 The judicial systems of both

1

UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Adopted by
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, art. 53(1) [hereinafter Rome Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook I at Tab 13]. For UN documentation, see the following: UN Doc. A/49/10, Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court with commentaries, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work
of Its Forty-sixth Session, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No 10 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
I at Tab 1]; UN Doc. A/50/22, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 617 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 2]; UN
Doc. A/51/10, Report of the International Law Commission, 48th Sess. 6 May to 26 July (1996) (G.A. 51st
Sess. Supp. No. 10) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 3]; UN Doc. A/51/22, Report of

1

Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are likely unable to handle the
prosecution of rebel leaders due to judicial corruption, lack of independence, poor
administration, and delay. One may argue that national prosecution in these cases would
undermine the interests of justice and that both cases are serious and grave enough to
warrant prosecution by the International Criminal Court.

the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume I
(Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August 1996) reprinted in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 385 (M. Cherif Bassiouni,
ed., 1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 4]; UN Doc. A/51/22, Report of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume II (Compilation
of proposals), reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 441 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 5];
UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5, 1997 Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session held in
New York 11 to 21 February 1997, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 369 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
II at Tab 6]; UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1, 1997 Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at
its Session held in New York 4 to 15 August 1997, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 349(M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook II at Tab7]; UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1, 1997 Decisions Taken by the
Preparatory Committee at its Session held in New York 1 to 12 December 1997, reprinted in THE STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 313 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed.,
1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 8]; UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 1998
Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 held in Zutphen, The Netherlands,
reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 221 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 9]; UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/2 (1998) Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Introduction & Draft Organization of Work , reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 115 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 10]; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998),
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft
Statute and Draft Final Act reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 119 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
II at Tab 11]; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.2 (1998) Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Rules of Procedure , reprinted in THE STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 211 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1998)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 12]; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (17 July 1998), Final
Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 14]; UN Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (13-31 March 2000, 12-30 June 2000), Report of the Preparatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court, Part I: Finalized draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
available at www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/jun2000/5thdocs.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook II at Tab 15].
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2. There is a Sound Argument that the Cases Referred to the International
Criminal Court by Uganda and by the Democratic Republic of Congo Do Not
Violate the Principle of Complementarity.
Article 17 of the Rome Statute provides the essence of the principle of
complementarity, stating that the ICC may not exercise its jurisdiction unless a state is
unwilling or unable to do so. The Rome Statute is silent, however, on the permissibility
of a State Party waiving the protections of the principle of complementarity. One may
argue that the issue of waiver should therefore be decided by the Court on a case-by-case
basis. With regard to Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC prosecution is
likely the best and only option for serving the interests of international justice.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Situation in Uganda
The situation in northern Uganda is one of armed conflict spanning 18 years and
claiming thousands of civilian lives.2 The main conflict is between the current
government of Uganda, which is composed of former rebels who forcibly overthrew their
predecessors in 1986, and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda, a
group of armed rebels currently (and for the past 18 years) attempting government
overthrow.
Both sides in the conflict are accused of criminal wrongdoing. The state and
military forces of Uganda are accused of human rights abuses such as illegal arrest and
detention, torture, and unlawful death,3 most of which are allegedly of a political nature.4
2

Amnesty International, Public Statement: Uganda: International Criminal Court investigation an
important step toward ending impunity, 29 July 2004, News Service No: 191, AI Index: AFR 59/006/2004,
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR590062004 [hereinafter AI Public Statement]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 22].

3

Human Rights Watch, State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, March 2004, Vol. 16, No. 4 (A), p.6-7,
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uganda0404/uganda0304.pdf [hereinafter Torture in

3

The LRA is accused of executing a campaign of terror against civilians in northern and
eastern Uganda, including the widespread abduction and abuse of children.5
The Ugandan government referred the situation to the ICC in January 2004, and
the ICC prosecutor announced his intention to investigate. The Prosecutor’s decision was
met with widespread condemnation from the human rights community.6 This seeming
paradox stems from the problems of reconciling international and local jurisdictions and
of balancing the interests of peace and justice.7
Human rights advocates and non-governmental organizations suggest that the
situation in Uganda presents the ICC with an opportunity to prove itself,8 however the
appropriateness of ICC prosecution under the circumstances is questioned by groups
working for peace in the region.9 At issue is the Amnesty Law of 2000, passed by the
Ugandan parliament, which represents the attempts of activists to “salvage their last, best

Uganda](listing 12 factors that support the government’s alleged wrongful acts, including the condition of
impunity for government forces) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 32].
4

Torture in Uganda, supra note 3, at 23 (claiming that a majority of detainees are tortured because of their
actual or alleged political activities, including, often, support of the opposition presidential candidate or,
sometimes, simply knowing a supporter or rebel) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab
32] . For a non-statistical compilation of interviews of former and current prisoners of the Ugandan
government, in both political and non-political cases, see id. at 22-58.

5

Id., at 14. For a list of other groups targeted by the Ugandan government, see id. at 14-15.

6

Adam Branch, International Justice, Local Injustice: The International Criminal Court in Northern
Uganda, Dissent, Summer 2004, Vol. 51, Issue 3, p22, 22 at
http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=aph&an=13796694.
(noting that protest of the ICC’s involvement came from organizations that were working for peace in
northern Uganda, including activists, lawyers, and civil-society organizations) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 43].

7

Id., at 22.

8

Id. See also AI Public Statement, supra note 2 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 22];
HRW, Investigate All Sides, infra note 15 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 29].
9

Branch, supra note 6, at 23 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 43].
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chance for peace,”10 but which is fundamentally threatened by ICC prosecution and the
government’s decision to exclude only LRA members from the protection of amnesty.11
Human rights organizations insist that responsibility be taken for the actions of
the army of the Ugandan government, the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF).12
The UPDF’s activities against civilians have been of a vicious nature,13 leading the
people of Northern Uganda to cry genocide.14 Yet, while human rights groups have called
for ICC prosecution of members of both the rebel LRA and the government’s UPDF,15
some think that the attention will be one-sided, falling with particular force upon the
LRA.16

10

Torture in Uganda, supra note 3, at 17-19 (describing the Amnesty Law as extending to all participants
in the Ugandan conflict, on all sides and at all levels of command) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook VI at Tab 32]; Branch, supra note 6, at 24 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab
43].
11

Branch, supra note 6, at 24 (expressing the belief of some that the only way to stop LRA violence is by
stopping the violence against the LRA and supporting an amnesty that protects it and stating that the
government’s own intention in enacting the law was to encourage rebels to disband) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 43]. For a discussion of the amendment of the Amnesty Law to exclude
LRA members, see id. at 24 (stating the intention of the president of Uganda to hold the LRA leadership
accountable because they bear “the greatest responsibility for the crimes against humanity committed in
Northern Uganda.”); accord HWR, Investigate All Sides, infra note 15 (stating that the amendment does
not limit the ICC’s ability to prosecute individuals on all sides of the conflict) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook VI at Tab 29].

12

Branch, supra note 6, 23 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 43].

13

Id. (reporting that the government maintains forced displaced people’s camps, or “protected villages,”
that are understaffed, undersupplied in violation of Geneva Conventions, and unprotected, leaving them
completely vulnerable to LRA attacks)(reporting that civilians found outside the camps are killed by the
UPDF); AI Public Statement, supra note 2 (reporting allegations that the Ugandan security forces retrain
for their own ranks children who have escaped LRA captivity) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
VI at Tab 22].

14

Branch, supra note 6, at 23 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 43].

15

Id., at 23-24; AI Public Statement, supra note 2 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab
22]; Human Rights Watch, ICC: Investigate All Sides in Uganda – Chance for Impartial ICC Investigation
into Serious Crimes a Welcome Step, February 4, 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/04/uganda7264_txt.htm [hereinafter HRW, Investigate All Sides]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 29].
16

Branch, supra note 6, at 24 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 43].
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Critics suggest that the Ugandan president referred the situation to the ICC for
purely political reasons and that he “would not have initiated a prosecution he did not
think he could control.”17 While the ICC prosecutor may decide to include investigation
and prosecution of the UPDF, peace advocates believe that there will be no pressure from
the international community to do so and that the ICC’s involvement will be a one-sided
attack on the LRA.18
B. The Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) involves the targeting
of civilians in the Ituri region for torture, execution and ethnic massacre, abduction, rape,
and the forced military recruitment of children.19 “Ituri is the battleground for the war
between the governments of Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC which have provided
political and military support to local armed groups despite abundant evidence of their
widespread violations of international humanitarian law.”20

17

Branch, supra note 6, at 24 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 43].

18

Id.

19

Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo: Ituri: “Covered in Blood”: Ethnically Targeted
Violence in Northeastern DR Congo, Vol. 15, No. 11 (A), July 2003, p.1, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/DRC0703full.pdf [hereinafter Ituri: Covered in Blood] [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 28]; see id. (noting the United Nations estimation that 50,000
civilians have died in the Ituri conflict since 1999 and the further estimation that over 500,000 have been
forced to flee their homes.); Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of the Congo: “Our brothers who
help kill us” – economic exploitation and human rights abuses in the east.”, 1 April 2003, AI Index: AFR
62/010/2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR620102003 (stating that the interethnic killings in Ituri “are intimately linked to political manipulation and insecurity created by combatant
forces” and that “[c]onstant shifts in political and military alliances based on economic interests have left a
political vacuum and stoked ethnic conflicts.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 18].
See generally id. for a discussion of the economic issues underlying the DRC’s larger conflict. See id. at
Part X for a discussion of the legal framework of the conflict.
20

Ituri: Covered in Blood, supra note 19, at 2. See id. (claiming that the governments of Uganda, Rwanda
and the DRC share culpability because they have failed to prevent the abuses of the armed groups they
support) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 28]; accord Human Rights Watch, ICC’s
First-Ever Probe Must be Effective – Criminal Responsibility in Congo Conflict Reaches Across Borders,

6

While international leaders and the UN Security Council have regularly
denounced the crimes, they have not offered effective meaningful assistance in achieving
peace or justice.21 The DRC joined the ICC, in part, because of its failure to gain
international assistance to end the conflict in Ituri.22 Although human rights advocates
urged the ICC Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio motu,23 it was a State
referral from the DRC that triggered ICC involvement.
The current ability of the DRC’s national judicial system to administer justice in Ituri
is in serious question.24 Human Rights Watch reports a state of breakdown and disarray,
citing critical deficiencies in judicial independence, training, investigative capacity, and

23 June 2004, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/23/congo8936_txt.htm [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook VI at Tab 30].
21

Ituri: Covered in Blood, supra note 19, at 2 (“Until recently, the conflict in Ituri has been largely ignored
by the international community. Despite information to the contrary, some UN member states and UN
officials viewed Ituri as merely a ‘tribal war’ not related to the broader war in the DRC. Between 1999 and
April 2003 the U.N. Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) had only a small team of fewer than ten
observers covering this volatile area of some 4.2 million people. MONUC forces were urgently increased to
several hundred in April 2003, but they had no capability to protect thousands of civilians who fled to them
for protection when fighting against broke out between opposing militia groups in early May. The UN
Security Council authorised an Interim Emergency Multinational Force with a Chapter VII mandate to
protect civilians and UN staff in the town of Bunia for a short period while MONUC reinforced its
presence. This decision, while helpful to residents of the town, has left tens of thousands of civilians
outside Bunia unprotected and at the mercy of armed groups who continue to fight.”); accord Amnesty
International, supra note 19, at Conclusion (stating that “only a very strong, genuine and unequivocal
political will on the part of the UN Security Council and concerted international action using a combination
of measures, including approaches to corporate social responsibility, will succeed in bringing an end to the
human rights and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at
Tab 28]. For a discussion of the international response to the situation in Ituri, see id. at 50-55 (discussing
the responses of the United Nations, international donors, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and
the United States).
22

Heindel, infra note 92, at 350 n.34 (noting that the DRC has been unsuccessful in prolonged attempts to
have an ad hoc war crimes tribunal set up there by the U.N. Security Council) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 6].

23

Ituri: Covered in Blood, supra note 19, at 4 (issuing a Human Rights Watch recommendation to the
office of the ICC Prosecutor) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 28].
24

Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo Confronting Impunity, Briefing Paper January
2004, p.4, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/02/congo7230.htm [hereinafter Confronting
Impunity] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 27].
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standards for fair trial.25 While efforts are underway to restore the judicial system in Ituri,
progress is labored and slow, hindered by many obstacles.26 Notably, Human Rights
Watch blames the local court’s failure to prosecute the more serious cases on a lack of
political will.27 Currently, and for the foreseeable future, the best hope for combating
impunity is for cooperation between the ICC and the national judicial system of the
DRC.28

25

Id., at 4-6. Accord Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo: Briefing to the 60th Session of
the UN Committee on Human Rights, January 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/29/congo7128.htm [hereinafter HRW UN briefing](stating that the
judicial system of the DRC must be rebuilt and that the process will require the investment of “enormous
human and material resources”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 26].
26

Human Rights Watch, Making Justice Work: Restoration of the Legal System in Ituri, DRC, A Human
Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Background Briefing, 2 September 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/drc0904/index.htm [hereinafter Making Justice Work] (providing an
overview of the program that has been installed to rebuild the justice system in Ituri, which is supported by
the DRC, the European Commission, and the Cooperation Department of the French government)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 31]. For a discussion of the obstacles faced by the
program’s rebuilding effort, see id. at Parts III – VI (outlining the failure to prosecute the most serious
crimes, the security fears of witnesses to testify and of authorities to arrest suspects in dangerous areas, the
uncertainty as to venue, the lack of adequate financial support and resource management, and the limited
capacity of the prosecutor to investigate crimes).

27

Human Rights Watch, D.R. Congo: Ituri Court Must Prosecute Gravest Crimes – Donors and DRC
Authorities Should Increase Funding for Local Courts, Human Rights News, 2 September 2004, available
at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/02/congo9291.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI
at Tab 25]. For a discussion of the effects of political rivalries in the DRC, see Human Rights Watch, The
Democratic Republic of Congo: Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife, 26-27
(2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/drc/DRC0301.PDF [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook VI at Tab 33].

28

Confronting Impunity, supra note 24, at 9 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 27]; see
also HWR UN briefing, supra note 25 (asserting that “[a]n ICC prosecution could greatly assist
accountability in the country and could also be a means to strengthen national capacity to bring justice for
serious past crimes”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 26]. For a discussion of the
DRC’s implementing legislation enacted for the purpose of allowing cooperation with the ICC, see
Amnesty International, Uganda: Concerns about the International Criminal Court Bill 2004, 27 July 2004,
AI Index: AFR 59/005/2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR590052004
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 23].
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III. THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. The Rome Statute’s Rules of Jurisdiction and Admissibility
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court29 sets out rules of
jurisdiction and admissibility.30 They are interrelated such that each case must meet the
requirements of both, thus implementing the principle of complementarity.
The Rome Statute’s scheme presumes that a case is admissible to the ICC where
jurisdiction has been established. Thus, if ICC jurisdiction is established by State Party
referral, the case is admissible and the Prosecutor may proceed, barring specific
circumstances. These circumstances, articulated in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which
may render a case inadmissible before the ICC, are summarized as follows: if “any state
(including non-party states) with jurisdiction over the matter is investigating or
prosecuting or has determined not to prosecute,”31 and, in addition, the state formally
requests that the ICC defer investigation, then the case is not admissible before the ICC.
This request for ICC deferral is the mechanism through with nations can bar ICC
jurisdiction (i.e., this is the essential operation of the complementarity regime).
Negotiation of the Court’s jurisdiction was the most challenging political hurdle

29

Rome Statute, supra note 1 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 13].

30

For a discussion of jurisdiction and admissibility with respect to the ICC, see generally WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 67-89 (2003) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook IV at Tab 36]. For an overview of the scope of ICC jurisdiction, see JACKSON
NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VERSAILLES TO ROME
237-45 (2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 30].
31

Mark A. Summers, A Fresh Look at the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court: The Case for Scrapping the Treaty, 20 WIS. INT’L L. J. 57, 69-70 (2001) [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook V at Tab 11]; Human Rights Watch, Justice in the Balance: Recommendations
for an Independent and Effective International Criminal Court 75 (1998) [hereinafter Justice in the
Balance](recommending that the burden of proof as to admissibility should be upon a state challenging the
ICC) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 34].
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for the delegations at Rome.32 The principle of complementarity was crafted to be the
most powerful safeguard against politically motivated prosecutions.33 The Statute
specifically provides that the ICC “shall be complementary to national jurisdictions,”34
and the ICC’s lack of primacy over national jurisdictions is largely the effect of the
power of state sovereignty.35 It represents a departure from the approach of ad hoc
international tribunals in part due to its nature as a permanent court.36
However, critics caution that if the complementarity regime lacks either a reliable
mechanism for evaluating national justice systems or a sufficient degree of freedom from
jurisdictional limitations, then the ICC would not have the power to enforce international
norms in the face of state sovereignty.37 “The Court will face serious challenges that will
question its independence from political institutions, its legitimacy as an authentic

32

Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the International
Criminal Court, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ADRIAN
BOS. 57, 58 (Herman A.M. von Hebel, Johan G. Lammers and Jolien Schukking, eds, 1999)(discussing the
many troublesome points encountered during the development of the ICC’s jurisdiction, including for
example trigger mechanisms, admissibility and challenges to jurisdiction) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook III at Tab 24].
33

Heindel, infra note 92, at 359 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 6]; for a discussion
of the fear of politically motivated prosecutions, see generally id. at 357-60.

34

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1. Article 1 states: “An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is
hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be
governed by the provisions of this Statute.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 13].

35

Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 386-87 (1998) (“A decline in jurisdictional
priority from the primacy of the ad hoc Tribunals to the complementarity of the ICC is probably inevitable.
Primacy compromises states' sovereign prerogatives by requiring them to defer to an international tribunal,
and, more generally, to cooperate with the international court and to obey its orders concerning such
matters as the production of evidence and the arrest and detention of persons.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 45].
36

Id., at 388.

37

Id., at 389.
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interpreter of international norms, and its accountability to the states that created it and
whose nationals face prosecution within its courtrooms.”38
The negotiations in the Preparatory Committee resulted in a “two-track system of
jurisdiction.”39 The first track would include situations referred to the Court by the
Security Council.40 It comported well with the view that ICC jurisdiction should be
subject to strong limitations.
The second track would be composed of situations referred to the Court either by
the Prosecutor of the ICC or by individual states.41 It was a major focus of concern for
delegations (especially the delegation from the United States) who feared an ICC with

38

Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 511 (2003). (acknowledging that the ICC will be
scrutinized and attacked for its effects upon international politics) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook V at Tab 49]. For an explanation of the consideration of this issue prior to the Rome Conference,
see Brown, supra note 35, at 388 (“The full promise of an independent and impartial ICC, capable of
ensuring that no serious international crime within its jurisdiction goes unpunished, will be realized only if
states can agree on treaty language that allows effective jurisdiction and true independence from political
control.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 45].
39

Scott W. Andreasen, The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution Preclude its Ratification
by the United States?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 697, 723 (2000)(citing Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the
U.S. National Interest?: Hearings on the U.N. Int’l Criminal Court Before the Subcomm. On Int’l
Operations of the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of Professor
Michael P. Scharf) (discussing the controversy over control of the ICC) [Reproduced in the accompanying
accompanying notebook VI at Tab 42])) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 40].

40

Andreasen, supra note 39, at 723 (citing Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National
Interest?: Hearings on the U.N. Int’l Criminal Court Before the Subcomm. On Int’l Operations of the
Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of Professor Michael P. Scharf)
(discussing the controversy over control of the ICC) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab
42]) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 40]. For a discussion of the political
implications in Security Council involvement, see Brown, supra note 35, at 388 (noting that “[r]eserving a
direct role for the Security Council in determining the jurisdiction of the ICC would make it easier for the
permanent members to protect their interests and presumably would strengthen support for the ICC within
the Security Council” but cautioning that “[i]f this role is too great, however, it will compromise the ICC's
integrity and credibility.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 45].
41

Andreasen, supra note 39, at 723 (citing Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National
Interest?: Hearings on the U.N. Int’l Criminal Court Before the Subcomm. On Int’l Operations of the
Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of Professor Michael P. Scharf)
(discussing the controversy over control of the ICC)[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab
42]) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 40].
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unchecked power to prosecute.42 It was this fear that prompted the incorporation of the
protective mechanism of complementarity into the Rome Statute.43
B. The International Criminal Court as a Court of Last Resort
At its inception, the ICC was conceived of as a court of last resort. The Rome
Statute was structured to ensure that the Court not act as a substitute for national
authorities.44

42

Andreasen, supra note 39, at 723 (citing Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National
Interest?: Hearings on the U.N. Int’l Criminal Court Before the Subcomm. On Int’l Operations of the
Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of Professor Michael P.
Scharf)[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 42]); id. at 723 n.198 (implying that a
prosecutor with too much power might abuse that power and thereby do serious damage to the reputation of
nations and to the credibility of the court) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 40].
43

Andreasen, supra note 39, at 723. (“Because the U.S. demanded protection from the second track of the
ICC’s jurisdiction, a number of protective mechanisms were incorporated into the Rome Statute. First the
ICC’s jurisdiction under the second track is based on ‘complementarity’ rather than primacy. This is
presented in the preamble of the Rome Statute, stating that the court ‘shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions.’ Essentially, complementarity mandates that the international tribunal cede authority
to try a case if there is a national court that is willing and able to do so.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook V at Tab 40]. This suggests that a state must be both willing and able to prosecute, or possibly
that the Court need not cede authority (i.e., may exercise authority) if there is no court meeting that
definition. If a nation is able to prosecute but prefers to waive its own jurisdiction of the ICC, that nation
does not meet the definition of being willing to prosecute. However, it also fails to meet the definition of
unwilling to prosecute; it simply does not intend to act. The existence of a complementarity requirement
presupposes that nations will desire to conduct prosecutions themselves.

44

KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND
COOPERATION 50 (2000) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]; See also Bruce
Broomhall, The International Criminal Court: Overview, and Cooperation with States, in ICC
RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 13 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 45, 66
(1999) [hereinafter Cooperation with States] (stating that the ICC does not supplant state legal systems and
making the distinction that “[i]f the link between the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction and the territorial and
national jurisdiction of States Parties allows the Court to be seen as an extension of the national criminal
jurisdiction of its States Parties…, the admissibility provisions make clear that the Court is not an extension
of the national criminal legal systems of those States.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at
Tab 44]; Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices – Part I,
London, January 1997, AI Index: IOR 40/001/1997, at 4, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400011997 [hereinafter Making the Right Choices, Part I]
(urging the need to ensure that national courts have primary jurisdiction) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook VI at Tab 19]. For a discussion of other jurisdictional options, see Madeline Morris,
Complementarity and Its Discontents: States, Victims, and the International Criminal Court, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (Dinah Shelton, ed., 2000) 177, 183-200 (discussing the pros and cons of two possible ICC
positions: one as the sole active jurisdiction and one of active concurrent jurisdiction with national courts)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 38].
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The ICC’s “last resort” status is confirmed by both the limited resources of the
Court and the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime.45 The budget of the ICC, like the
budgets of all international criminal courts, depends on funding from states or
international organizations.46 Yet, the dangers lurking in this arrangement are political in
nature. One critic suggests that “states will use their monetary leverage to influence the
tribunal’s work.”47 Others warn that the prosecutor’s choice of whether to become
involved is vulnerable to financial pressures and, possibly, manipulations.48

45

BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 115 (2003) (warning that the ICC will be financially capable of trying

only a very few cases given that its budget is limited) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at
Tab 21]. For an analysis of the ICC’s finances, see generally Ingadottir and Romano, infra note 46, at 47110 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 25].
46

Resolution ICC-ASP/2/Res.1, Programme budget for 2004, Working Capital Fund for 2004, scale of
assessments for the apportionment of expenses of the International Criminal Court and financing of
appropriation for 2004, adopted at the 5th plenary meeting, 12 September 2003, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/2ndsession/report/english/part_iv_res_1_e.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Budget]
(adopting the scale of assessments of the United Nations as a guide for States Parties’ contributions to the
ICC and setting the 2004 ICC budget at 53,071,846 EU) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at
Tab 40]; Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.4, Programme budget for 2005, Contingency Fund, Working Capital
Fund for 2005, scale of assessments for the apportionment of expenses of the International Criminal Court
and financing of appropriations for the year 2005, adopted at the 6th plenary meeting, 10 September 2004,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/statesparties/ICC-ASP-3-25-Part_III_English.pdf [hereinafter
2005 Budget] (setting the 2005 ICC budget at 66,784,200 EU) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
VI at Tab 41]; Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects,
17 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 132 (2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 47]; See also
Thordis Ingadottir and Cesare Romano, The Financing of the International Criminal Court, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICY AND PRACTICE – FINANCING, VICTIMS,
JUDGES, AND IMMUNITIES 47, 100 (Thordis Ingadottir, ed.) (noting that the financial responsibility of the
ICC belongs to its States Parties and that roughly 80 percent of the burden will fall on the European Union,
according to a budget scale modeled on the budget of the United Nations) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook III at Tab 25].
47

Cogan, supra note 46, at 133 (giving the example that “[o]ne need only look at the recent fracas over the
U.S. dues owed the United Nations, in which the United States successfully conditioned its payment on
U.N. reform, to appreciate how this might work.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab
47]. For conclusions recognizing the danger of relying upon individual states for funding, see Ingadottir
and Romano, supra note 46, at 100 (urging that strict regulations be adopted with respect to the payments
made by states parties) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 25]; id. at 67 (noting the
difficulties faced by the United Nations, the ICTY and the ICTR regarding non-payment or delayed
payment of state contributions and pointing to the consequences generally imposed under the Rome Statute
upon states delinquent in payment – suspension of voting rights in the Assembly).

48

Cf. Coalition for the International Criminal Court’s Budget and Finance Team, The 2004 Programme
Budget of the International Criminal Court and Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance,
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Furthermore, sovereign states have a fundamental interest in exercising national
jurisdiction.49 One argument holds that if the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction is avoided by
states in good faith, who view it as a true court of last resort, then the result should be a
greater consistency between the criminal laws of nations and a more universal standard of
human rights.50 Also, in cases where ICC prosecution would not be substantially different
in effect from national prosecution, an overstepping or disregard of state sovereignty is
probably not justified.51 This provides a strong support that the ICC must not have
primacy.52

submission to the second session of the Assembly of States Parties (8-12 September 2003), para. 34,
available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/asp/papersonaspissues/2ndASP/Budget_ASP_Paper_2003.FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter Coalition submission] (recommending that the ICC should not comply with requests that cost
be a primary factor in deciding to initiate investigations, as this would undermine the independence of the
ICC Prosecutor) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 24].
49

Arsanjani, infra note 91, at 24-25 (explaining that “in cases of concurrent jurisdiction between national
courts and the international criminal court, the former, in principle, have priority. The ICC is not intended
to replace national courts, but operates only when they do not. The understanding of the majority of
participating states was that states had a vital interest in remaining responsible and accountable for
prosecuting violations of their laws [emphasis added]. The international community had a comparable
interest, inasmuch as national systems are expected to maintain and enforce adherence to international
standards.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 41]. For a note on the ICC’s interest in
promoting national prosecutions in light of the ICC budget, see Coalition submission, supra note 48, at
para.32 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 24].
50

Schabas, infra note 57, at 205 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33].

51

Jeffrey Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 289 (1997) (discussing the
preference for national jurisdiction) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 42].
52

Arsanjani, infra note 91, at 24-25 (explaining that “in cases of concurrent jurisdiction between national
courts and the international criminal court, the former, in principle, have priority. The ICC is not intended
to replace national courts, but operates only when they do not. The understanding of the majority of
participating states was that states had a vital interest in remaining responsible and accountable for
prosecuting violations of their laws [emphasis added]. The international community had a comparable
interest, inasmuch as national systems are expected to maintain and enforce adherence to international
standards.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 41]; id. at 24 n.13 (explaining that the
complementarity regime is “one of the important differences between the ICC and the two ad hoc Tribunals
on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Under Article 9 of the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal and Article
8 of that of the Rwanda Tribunal, in case of concurrent jurisdiction by the Tribunals and national courts, the
Tribunals have primacy over national courts.”); For another explanation, see Brown, supra note 35, at 426
(stating that “problems with the practical enforcement of primacy by [the ICTY and the ICTR] make it
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However, the ICC may be the best possible venue for cases involving internal
ethnic war.53 Also, the supposed inviolability of the concept of state sovereignty is called
into question in a global society.54 It has been argued that certain human rights have
attained such a universal status that state sovereignty cannot shield violation.55 This view
supports the need for an ICC, but it also requires a universal acceptance of the legitimacy
of the Court’s jurisdiction.56
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
A. Development and Definition of the Principle of Complementarity
The concept of complementarity has evolved through the many stages of the
ICC’s development.57 The term first appeared in the Ad Hoc Committee as a name for the

clear that primacy is not a viable option for the ICC.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at
Tab 45].
53

W. Michael Reisman, Scenarios of Implementation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 281, 286-87
(Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001)(hypothesizing as to the probable positive impact of the ICC on
internal ethnic wars) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33]. Contrast with id. at 284
(hypothesizing as to the probable negligible or negative impact of the ICC on conventional wars).
54

John R. Worth, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty: Reconsidering the “UnSigning” of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker, 79 IND. L. J. 245, 260-65 (2004) (arguing
that traditional notions of state sovereignty must eventually make way for a more global concept of
sovereignty) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 14].
55

Id., at 264 (suggesting that “humanity, rather than territory, now serves as the jurisdictional link” for
crimes against universal human rights”). For a discussion of the merits of a powerful universal jurisdiction,
see Mohamed M. El Zeidy, Universal Jurisdiction In Absentia: Is it a Legal Valid Option for Repressing
Heinous Crimes?, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, vol. 37, no. 3 (Fall 2003) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 17].
56

Worth, supra note 54, at 265 (noting that the legitimization of institutions such as the ICC lags
necessarily behind the acceptance of certain human rights as universal and claiming that the reason lies in a
crucial need for acceptance of the institution’s structure in and of itself)(claiming that it is necessary that
“the court’s institutional and procedural structure [is] itself universally recognized” and that, to achieve
this, “the individual members of society, as the true sovereigns, would have to recognize the common good
to be gained by the transference of institutional authority from their own domestic courts to the
supranational ICC – a task which assuredly was not fulfilled at the Rome Conference.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 14].

57

William A. Schabas, Follow up to Rome: Preparing for Entry into Force of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A

15

concept of limited jurisdiction set forth in the 1994 ILC Draft Statute.58 It is currently
conceived as having three components: substantive, procedural, and prudential or
political.59 Of particular note here, the prudential or political component concerns the
policy choices made in determining which cases should be prosecuted by the ICC rather
than by the national courts.60
The 1994 ILC Draft Statute was the document that provided the basis for
discussion of the complementarity concept throughout most of the preparatory process.61
It provided that ICC jurisdiction should complement national jurisdiction “in cases where
such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective,”62 and that “a case
would only be admissible if it had not been duly investigated by a State or if the decision
of the State not to prosecute was not apparently well-founded (article 35).”63

CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 197, 204 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33]; Bartram S. Brown, The Statute of the ICC: Past, Present, and
Future, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 61 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl
Kaysen eds., 2000) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 37].
58

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 45 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].

59

LEILA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 119 (2002) (discussing the components of complementarity:
substantive, procedural, and prudential or political) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab
34]. For a discussion of political and prudential considerations, see Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and
the Prosecution of War Crimes, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS, VOLUME I, 389, 405-08 (Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald, Olivia Swank-Goldman, eds., 2000) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at
Tab 31].
60

SADAT, supra note 59, at 119 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 34].

61

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 49 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]. UN Doc.
A/49/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth Session, Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court with commentaries, 2 May – 22 July, 1994 (G.A., 49th Sess., Supp. No
10., 1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 1].
62

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 48 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]; 1994 ILC
Draft Statute, supra note 61, preamble [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 1].
63

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 48 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]; 1994 ILC
Draft Statute, supra note 61, art. 35 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 1].
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Unfortunately, this provision left the complementarity concept quite unclear, and the
commentary to the ILC Draft Statute did not help to clarify it. “If anything, the
Commentary focused on the role of national jurisdictions at the cost of the role of the
Court.”64
Complementarity was originally thought of (by the ILC) as a rough parallel to the
European principle of subsidiarity,65 which differs mainly in that it “govern[s] the
relationship between the member states of an economic, social and cultural
community.”66 The comparison “can be interesting… because both principles are
attempts to strike a balance between recognizing on the one hand the advantages of local
(national) authority and on the other hand the need for central (international) authority to
make the practice of states effective and uniform.”67 The subsidiarity principle gives
national institutions the first opportunity to deal with matters.68 It contemplates a question
of concurrent jurisdictional competence rather than primacy, as EU law is considered
supreme.69
The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) was next to work in depth with the

64

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 48 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].

65

Id., at 45.

66

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 46 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].

67

Id. For an argument that the ICC should adopt the subsidiarity principle, see John M. Czarnetsky and
Ronald J. Rychlak, An Empire or Law?: Legalism and the International Criminal Court, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 55, 122-23 (2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 48].
68

Id., at 45-46, quoting EU Treaty, Article 3b (“In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence,
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States and can therefore,
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action
by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”).
69

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 45 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].
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possibility of a complementarity regime for the ICC. Discussion focused mainly on the
concept with relation to the Prosecutor’s “right of initiative, inherent jurisdiction and
state cooperation.”70 The PrepCom found the question of whether to clearly state the
relationship between the ICC and national jurisdictions in the statute to be a fundamental
issue; however, it treated this question rather gingerly. The question was “only seldomly
and carefully voiced.”71 The PrepCom provided a broad picture, defining the word
“superficially as an expression ‘to reflect the jurisdictional relationship between the
international criminal court and national authorities, including national courts.’”72
It may be argued that “by letting the provisions of the Statute remain slightly
unresolved, one could have left room for gradual expansion of competence alongside
growing political acceptance of the Court in the future, just as international or
supranational courts have been seen to acquire more and more power.”73 Some states thus
agreed with the concept of complementarity laid out in the preamble of the 1994 ILC
Draft Statute and believed that if the concept were to be repeated in another part of the
statute it should not receive much elaboration.74
Yet, a serious danger of leaving the principle of complementarity too unclear and

70

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 45 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].

71

Id., at 46-47.

72

Id., at 45. See UN Doc. A/51/22, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Volume I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April
and August 1996), p. 30, paragraph 109 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 4].

73

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 47 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].

74

Id., at 47; See Statements in the Preparatory Committee by the representatives of Greece and Sweden,
UN Press Release L/2771 of 1 April 1996. (stating “such a court is intended to be complementary to
national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be
ineffective”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 38].
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unresolved was that states would, as a direct result, refuse to ratify the treaty.75 Also, this
lack of clarity might easily result in making the concept of complementarity a mere tool
of manipulation for draining power from the ICC.76 Absence of a clear rule could easily
undermine the authority of the ICC, making the Court altogether ineffective.77
In its discussions on the operation of the complementarity principle, the PrepCom
had two main alternatives. The first was to say that the ICC would have no jurisdiction
where national jurisdiction is being or had been exercised.78 The PrepCom’s final report,
which was submitted to the delegations at the Rome Conference, included this alternative
as a possibility needing further discussion.79 Some argued however that such a rule would
virtually invite sham prosecutions and trials,80 and ultimately this formulation was not

75

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 47 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]; For
example, see the statements in the Preparatory Committee of India and Morocco, UN Press Release L/2771
of 1 April 1996 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 38].
76

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 47 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]; see The
representative of Jamaica in the Sixth Committee (Legal), UN Press Release GA/L/3046 of 23 October
1997 (stating that an unclear articulation of complementarity would, in practice, be “nothing more than
coded language for an approach that results in diminishing the powers of the court.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook IV at Tab 37]. For comments on the jurisdictional aspect of the complementarity
regime, see Summers, supra note 31, at 88 (warning that allowing states “to specially accept the
jurisdiction of the Court, may tempt ill-meaning states to manipulate the Court to their own advantage, by
asserting jurisdiction in order to sidetrack other legitimate international enforcement measures” and that
“by requiring that either the state where the offense is committed or of which the accused is a national
accept the jurisdiction of the Court, the Statute invites states to shield their wrongdoers from justice merely
by abstaining”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 11].
77

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 47 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]. See UN
Doc. A/51/22, supra note 72, at 31, para. 113 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 4].
78

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 47 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]. See UN
Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.3/CRP.2 of 13 August 1997.
79

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 49 [Reproduced in the accompanying accompanying notebook IV at Tab
32]; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Statute and Draft Final Act, reprinted in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 211 (M. Cherif Bassiouni,
ed., 1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 11].
80

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 49 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].
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incorporated in the Rome Statute.
The second alternative was ultimately adopted in the Rome Statute. It provided, in
a rather detailed solution, a test requiring that “the state be ‘unwilling’ and ‘unable
genuinely’ to try the person.”81 Examples of unwillingness consisted of actions that were
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”82
Inevitably, the word complementarity has been used as a sort of smokescreen for
other purposes, including “state sovereignty and the lack of interest in an effective
international criminal jurisdiction.”83 It is most often employed by “restrictive states,
which [find] that it should be taken into account at every possible occasion.”84 The
principle may however be used by any state (including non-states parties) to challenge
the ICC’s jurisdiction.85 Still, despite these concerns and possible weaknesses, the Rome
Statute’s complementarity regime was unanimously approved by the delegations at Rome
as a support to national jurisdictions.86

81

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 49 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].

82

Id., quoting UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.3/CRP.2 of 13 August 1997. (giving examples of
unwillingness such as undue delay, proceedings that are not impartial or independent, and other behaviors
that indicate a nation’s intent to shield the accused).

83

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 45 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].

84

Id.

85

Andreasen, supra note 39, at 724 (“Under Article 17, any state, regardless of whether it is a party to the
Rome Statute, can challenge the ICC’s jurisdiction either where the state is investigating the situation, or
where the state declined investigation, unless the decision not to proceed was based on the state’s inability
or unwillingness to do so.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 40].

86

Cooperation with States, supra note 44, 66 (“Complementarity goes to the heart of the regime of the
Statute. The Diplomatic Conference was unanimous in its view that the ICC should strengthen and
complement, not replace national investigation and prosecutions.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook V at Tab 44]. For complementarity recommendations made subsequent to the Rome Conference,
see Human Rights Watch, Making the International Criminal Court Work: A Handbook for Implementing
the Rome Statute, 14-22 (2001) available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/handbook_e.pdf
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at Tab 35].
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B. The Rome Statute’s Incorporation of the Principle of Complementarity
The Rome Statute does not explicitly define complementarity.87 The articles on
admissibility do indicate, however, that it does not mean concurrent jurisdiction, which
was the meaning favored in the 1994 ILC Draft.88 The general view of complementarity
under international criminal law is that it is a jurisdictional concept denoting “a systemic
relationship between different jurisdictional authorities exercising competence over
international crimes, whether national or international judicial organs.”89 As it appears in
the Rome Statute, the concept of complementarity may be described as a system that
fully subordinates the jurisdiction of the ICC to the jurisdiction of national courts.90 The
ICC may assume jurisdiction only if nations are unable or unwilling to do so.91
87

MAOGOTO, supra note 30, at 247 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 30]. For an
overview of the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime, see Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to
the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly
Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 10-19 (2002) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 5].
88

MAOGOTO, supra note 30, at 247 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 30]. For a
discussion of the development of the principle of complementarity from the 1994 ILC Draft Statute to the
Rome Statute, see Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to
Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 890-930 (2002) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 15].
89

BASSIOUNI, INTRO. TO ICL, infra note 143, at 15-18 (discussing the meaning and operation of the
principle of complementarity in international criminal law (ICL) as comporting with a concept of
concurrent jurisdiction) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 19]; see id. at 15 n.57 (“The
term ‘complementarity’ entered the English language in 1911, meaning, ‘a complementary relationship or
situation; spec. in physics, the capacity of the wave and particle theories of light together to explain all
phenomena of a certain type, although each separately accounts for only some of the phenomena.’ OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY”)
90

Andreasen, supra note 39, at 724 (noting that Rome Statute Articles 17 and 18 express the rule of simple
complementarity as proposed by the United States) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab
40].

91

Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Developments in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 24-25) (1999) (describing the principle of
complementarity thus: “[T]he principle of complementarity, establishes that the court may assume
jurisdiction only when national legal systems are unable or unwilling to exercise jurisdiction…The
principle of complementarity was referred to in the preamble to the draft statute prepared by the
International Law Commission; in the final Rome text, in addition to the preamble, it also found its way
into Articles 1 and 17-19”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 41]. For a discussion of

21

Complementarity is considered to be the primary safeguard against politically motivated
prosecutions.92
The Rome Statute leaves it up to “the complementarity principle and State
consent regime to sort permissible from impermissible assertions of the Court’s
jurisdiction (to adjudicate).”93 The issue of complementarity is implicit in the issue of
admissibility. Of importance are the subjects of: (1) “criteria for declaring a case
inadmissible,” (2) “the competence of the Court to determine whether the criteria are
met,” and (3) “the prohibition on double jeopardy.”94
1. Article 17
Article 17 is the Rome Statute’s main provision on complementarity. Paragraph 1
sets out four factors for finding a case inadmissible.95 Paragraph 2 sets out factors for

the procedures under complementarity, see John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the
ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, VOLUME I 667,
679-84 (Antonio Cassese, et al., eds., 2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 23].
92

Anne K. Heindel, International Human Rights & U.S. Foreign Policy: The Counterproductive Bush
Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 345, 359 (2004)
(explaining that the complementarity regime protects against politically motivated prosecutions by
requiring the ICC to defer to states that are able and genuinely willing to exercise national jurisdiction)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 6].
93

MAOGOTO, supra note 30, at 246 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 30].

94

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 47-49 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].

95

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17(1)(a)-(d) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 13];
Arsanjani, supra note 91, at 27-28 (identifying the grounds for inadmissibility and their limitations as
follows: “[Article 17] identifies four grounds of inadmissibility: (1) the case is being investigated or
prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it; (2) the case has been investigated by a state that has
jurisdiction over it and the state decided not to prosecute the person concerned; (3) the person concerned
has already been tried for the conduct in question; and (4) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify
action by the court. The first three grounds for inadmissibility, however, are subject to specific limitations:
that the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; that the national
prosecution was conducted for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility
for crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction; or that the national prosecution was not conducted independently
or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and lacked a
meaningful intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V
at Tab 41].
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determining whether a state is unwilling to prosecute.96 Paragraph 3 sets out factors for
determining whether a state is genuinely unable to prosecute.97 The criteria in paragraphs
2 and 3 were the result of much debate.98
Importantly, Article 17(1) describes the four circumstances in which a case will
be inadmissible. Article 17’s inadmissibility requirements, coupled with Article 19, imply
the rule that “the Court has no obligation to determine the admissibility of a case before
it,”99 unless a state challenges admissibility. Thus, if a case falls under the jurisdiction of
the Court according to the provisions of Article 12,100 then the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction unless a state successfully challenges the case’s admissibility.
The wording of Article 17 – “the Court shall determine that a case is

96

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(a)-(c) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 13].

97

Id., art. 17(3).

98

Arsanjani, supra note 91, at 28 (noting that the criteria for determining a state’s inability or unwillingness
“were thorny issues that were skillfully negotiated by Canada during the negotiations in the Preparatory
Committee.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 41].

99

Arsanjani, supra note 32, at 74 (implying, based on the language of Articles 17 and 19 of the Rome
Statute, that the Court need not determine the admissibility of a case unless the admissibility is validly
challenged) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 24].

100

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12.
Article 12 provides:
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to
the crimes referred to in article 5.
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the
following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with
paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on
board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State
may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect
to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception
in accordance with Part 9.
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inadmissible”101 – gives the ICC itself the authority to determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction. The Court’s competence to decide when it may assert its jurisdiction over
national jurisdiction is thus assumed.102 The concern addressed by the Article is thus not
that the ICC will assume jurisdiction in inappropriate cases, but is rather that
governments will wish to shield certain people from “genuine and effective
prosecution.”103
“[T]he ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ determinations are fraught with political
peril, both for the Prosecutor and for the Court.”104 The determinations require the ICC to
evaluate and pass judgment upon a state’s judicial system, and the risk, therefore, is of
the ICC’s power to impose a public and political shame upon a sovereign nation.105 It
101

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 13].
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KIM, infra note 108, at 259 (noting that the most important aspect of Article 17 is that it gives the ICC
the ultimate power to decide whether or not a case is admissible) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook IV at Tab 26].
103

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 50 (stressing that if the ICC is to effectively guard against impunity, it is
crucial that the Court be found competent to decide whether a nation’s prosecution or trial is genuine)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].
104

Danner, supra note 38, at 517 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 49].
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Id., at 518 (pointing to Justice Arbour’s comment that “the admissibility regime essentially requires the
Prosecutor to put a domestic system of criminal justice on trial.”) (“The Prosecutor will have to prove
either that a state’s criminal justice system is incompetent or that it is being manipulated by the state’s
government. These questions have far-ranging political overtones, and will pose a significant challenge for
the ICC’s Prosecutor.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 49]; Justice in the Balance,
supra note 31, at 70 (recommending that the ICC should prosecute where national proceedings are
“ineffective” or “unavailable,” as opposed to the established “unwilling” or “unable” rule that has been
adopted, giving the reason that the latter requires a determination of intent) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook VI at Tab 34]. For a discussion of the dangers of politicized prosecution, see
generally David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85 (2004) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 8]; id. at 92 (stating that “the possibility of politicized prosecution
may undermine the requirement of national justice”); See also Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva
Conventions: Disturbing Background to the ICC Debate, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 169 (2003) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 10]; Tikkun A. S. Gottschalk, The Realpolitik of Empire, 13 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 299-300 (2003) (giving the example of the proposed investigation of NATO
by the ICTY, which was said to be little more than a threat of political embarrassment) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 4]; see also Summers, supra note 31, at 88 (implying that the NATO
situation was a deliberate manipulation of the court) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab
11].
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follows also that a nation, in recognition of this power, might attempt to direct it to their
own political advantage.106 Yet, with regard to a State’s preference of ICC jurisdiction,
these determinations do not technically apply. The test of “unwillingness” or “inability”
applies to cases in which national proceedings have taken place107 and the ICC seeks to
substitute its jurisdiction.
Referrals by States present another issue of concern. “[S]ome states are afraid that
the State referral procedure could be abused by politically-motivated and frivolous
referrals. However, the possibility of this situation seems rare considering the reluctance
of states to refer and the rigorous admissibility test under the principle of
complementarity.”108 The political reason behind State preference for ICC involvement
may only have an effect on the inadmissibility determination in 17(1)(d), which removes
a case from ICC jurisdiction where it is “not of sufficient gravity to justify further action
by the Court.”109
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The political overtones here are especially far-ranging and raise a number of crucial questions. For
example, what if a country consents to jurisdiction for no reason other than to escape a judgment that its
government or judicial system cannot be relied upon to administer justice under the circumstances? What if
the sole reasons for consent are a desire to draw international attention to a situation or to shift the
responsibility of prosecution away from the state? Conceivably, consent might be used as a way to lift the
burden and expense of prosecution – at the expense of the international community – so that a calmer
political climate can be achieved within a state (so that supporters of the accused blame the international
community rather than the current national government). See, for example, Danner, supra note 38, at 519
n.72. (“Some observers speculate that states will lobby the Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio
motu, even if the state could have referred the case to the Prosecutor itself. ‘The result will be the same, but
they will save the diplomatic discomforts that accompany public denunciation.’ WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 100 (2001).”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook V at Tab 49].
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Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a)-(b) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 13].
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YOUNG SOK KIM, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY TO THE ROME STATUTE 243
(2003) (providing a commentary on Article 14’s provision allowing states to refer situations to the ICC)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 26].
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Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(d) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 13].
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C. Violation of the Principle of Complementarity
1. Contemplated Violations of the Principle of Complementarity
When delegates at Rome, drafters, and legal scholars considered the possibility
that complementarity may be violated, the anticipated perpetrator was the ICC itself. Past
and current contemplation of safeguards involves an almost exclusive discussion of
limiting the reach of the ICC, not of protecting against State preference for ICC
involvement. Complementarity’s key feature is the power it vests in states to curtail the
powers of the ICC Prosecutor and to bar ICC prosecution.110 Waiver of this right is not
contemplated by the statute.
The general complementarity challenge scenario is one in which a state wishes to
bar the ICC from prosecuting a case over which the state has jurisdiction. The
expectation is both that the ICC Prosecutor will have to decide whether to challenge a
state’s willingness to administer justice and also that the state will defend its right to
exercise national jurisdiction.111 Because a challenge to a state’s willingness “pit[s] the
credibility of the Court against a state,”112 the ICC’s credibility is arguably increased by a
state’s preference for ICC jurisdiction.
Notably, the Rome Statute does not give the Court the power to compel States to
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Danner, supra note 38, at 526-27 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 49].
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Id., 522 (predicting that where states face a challenge to their willingness to prosecute, they will defend
against the challenge – and against ICC jurisdiction – with considerable indignation), at 527-28 (predicting
that where the ICC indicates an intention to investigate, states will exhibit resistance instead of the
cooperativeness which is crucial to obtaining convictions), and at 527 (noting that the ICC will depend on
states “in order to perform all of its primary functions” because it has “no associated police and no direct
coercive powers over individuals”); BROOMHALL, supra note 45, at 139 (claiming that “[b]ecause of its
complementarity to national jurisdictions…, the Rome Statute gives States a real incentive to exercise
jurisdiction over their own officials if they wish to avoid the Court doing so”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook III at Tab 21].
112

Danner, supra note 38, at 522 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 49].
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comply with its orders or to sanction States directly for non-compliance.113 Furthermore,
the personnel of the Court will generally be subject to national law when acting in State
territory.114 “The future of the ICC depends on all States Parties adopting requisite laws
that will enable each country to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate with the
ICC imposed on States Parties by the Rome Statute is twofold: a general commitment to
cooperate, and an obligation to amend their domestic laws to permit cooperation with the
Court.”115
The subject of national grants of immunity presents an interesting parallel to the
issue of waiver of the complementarity regime.116 Governments generally seek to avoid
the political problems associated with the prosecution of high officials in two ways. First,
113

MAOGOTO, supra note 30, at 252 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 30].

114

Id., at 252-53.

115

Id., at 253.
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The issue of national grants of immunity is important because it arguably frustrates the goal of ending
impunity for criminal acts. The problems posed by immunity are briefly defined by BROOMHALL, supra
note 45, at 139 (“National laws and constitutions, which frequently provide conditional or unconditional
exemption from criminal proceedings for those who hold current offices, may sometimes stand in the way
either of domestic proceedings pursuant to the complementarity principle [emphasis added] or of surrender
to the ICC, and as such will call for attention in a number of States.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook III at Tab 21]. For a discussion on waiver of immunities see Duffy, infra note 117, at 32
(claiming that there is “no inherent contradiction between immunity and the Statute” and noting that if the
ICC were to request the surrender of an individual then the state would have to waive the immunity)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 50]; see also Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in International Criminal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 802-09
(2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 2]; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in POST
CONFLICT JUSTICE 3-54 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed.)(2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at
Tab 20]. Compare Madeline Morris, Lacking a Leviathan: The Quandaries of Peace and Accountability, in
POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 135, 135-53 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed.)(2002) (discussing the peace-versusaccountability problem in light of the relationship between national and international jurisdictions)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 20]; Zeidy, supra note 88, at 940-57 (discussing the
threat to the Rome Statute’s validity posed by state amnesties and pardons) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 15]; Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Making
the Right Choices – Part III, London, November 1997, AI Index: IOR 40/013/1997, available at http:
//web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400131997 (recommending that amnesties and pardons not be a bar
to ICC jurisdiction of serious violations of humanitarian law) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
VI at Tab 20].

27

some governments “mak[e] amendments only to allow surrender to the ICC, without
removing the immunities that will prevent their authorities from investigating
themselves.”117 Second, other governments “[interpret] national immunities in a manner
that allows both domestic proceedings and surrender to the ICC.”118
Both methods are an indirect way of preferring ICC jurisdiction over national
jurisdiction, and both are more contrary, arguably, to the essential purpose of the Court
than the referrals made by Uganda and DRC.119 For under the circumstances, these
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BROOMHALL, supra note 45, at 139 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 21]. For an
example of this approach involving the nation of France, see id. at 139-40 (“As a preliminary step to
ratification, the government of France referred the Rome Statute to its constitutional court on 24 December
1998. The Conseil Constitutionnel recognized that Article 27 was potentially incompatible with the
provisions of the French Constitution that establish immunities and special procedures for France’s head of
State and for members of government and parliament. In response, the French government amended its
constitution to indicate that the Republic of France ‘may recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC in the
conditions set out in the treaty signed 18 July 1998. This would appear to allow France to surrender
individuals to the ICC, thus opening a path towards fulfillment of its obligation to cooperate with the Court
under Article 86. Yet because France has not amended its constitutional immunities per se, the new
provision does nothing to increase the power of French authorities to meet the full requirements of the
complementarity test with respect to proceedings before their own courts. The ICC is therefore the only
venue for trying a limited set of high French officials (barring the exercise of universal jurisdiction). Such
an approach allows governments to avoid many of the political difficulties involved in changing their laws
or constitution or in initiating proceedings, and may prove attractive for others.”) This description of
France’s approach indicates that it may be viewed as a workable and acceptable solution. For further
support of this approach, see id. at 100 (noting that “the structure of the admissibility provisions raises the
possibility that cases will be admissible before the Court when an amnesty bars prosecution at the national
level.”). See also Darryl Robinson, The Rome Statute and Its Impact on National Laws, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II 1849, 1855-56 (Antonio
Cassese, et al., eds., 2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 23]; See also Helen
Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court, 11 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 5, 9-13 (2001) (describing the approach of the French government and outlining the approaches of
other nations) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 50]. For a discussion of the adjustment
of national jurisdictions to the ICC, see generally Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Newton, Comparative
Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 9].
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BROOMHALL, supra note 45, at 139 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 21].

119

The fundamental purpose of the ICC is to end impunity. For a succinct statement of the ICC’s purpose
in light of the complementarity principle see Bos, infra note 131, at 26 [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook IV at Tab 33]. For a more general statement, see Schabas, supra note 57, at 204 (stating that “the
Court was created precisely because States do not assume their responsibilities [of prosecution]”)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33]. For an overview of comments made to the
Preparatory Committee by states representatives, see UN Press Release L/2779 of 8 April 1996, available
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19960408.l2779.html [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook VI at Tab 39].

28

governments virtually ensure that if the ICC does not prosecute then there will be no
prosecution at all. If these results are acceptable, then they lend support to the practice of
preferring ICC jurisdiction by waiving rights under the complementarity regime by
casting it in a much better light. There is, after all, a strong showing by Uganda and DRC
of an intent to deliver criminals to justice – not to grant them immunity.
2. Concerns of States Parties
States delegations’ discussions on the subjects of complementarity and
admissibility have been labored and unclear.120 However, it is well established that the
desire underlying negotiations has been to create an effective court. If the Court is to be
effective, it must have the ability to address crimes of concern to the international
community where national jurisdictions have failed appropriately do so.121
Concerning the ICC’s jurisdiction, some states favored the model of the ad hoc
tribunals, which have a general primary jurisdiction over national courts.122 Small states,
especially, felt that a strong international tribunal could successfully prosecute where the
judicial systems of small nations were easily overwhelmed or intimidated.123
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MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 50 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]. For an
examination into the lack of clarity concerning the meaning of complementarity and its implications, see
generally Madeline Morris, Complementarity and Conflict: States, Victims, and the ICC, in THE UNITED
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 195 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen, eds., 2000)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 37].
121

Id. See also, Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices – Part
V: Recommendations to the diplomatic conference, May 1998, AI Index: IOR 40/010/1998, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400101998, at 23 (urging that national amnesties must not
impede or block the power of the ICC to bring people to justice) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook VI at Tab 21].
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MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 41 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].
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Arsanjani, supra note 91, at 24 n.13 (“In the original request for the establishment of an international
criminal court, Trinidad and Tobago’s concern was the inadequacy of national criminal laws and
jurisdiction to deal with drug trafficking. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Trinidad and
Tobago, supra note 1. Some of the concerns of smaller states were that in relation to certain crimes such as
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Other states opposed primary jurisdiction, believing that the ICC should have no
part in situations where States were prosecuting in good faith.124 Yet, the strengthened
complementarity regime, reflected in the Article 18 safeguards, provides a number of
procedural obstacles that a State may seek to use in bad faith.125 Furthermore, “there is a
risk that the actions of a State which is genuinely pursuing justice may be misunderstood
by the Prosecutor or otherwise not found sufficient by him or her.126
“Opponents of the ICC argue that the greatest danger of the ICC lies in its broad
jurisdiction and the possible expansion and abuse of that jurisdiction.”127 However, at the

drug trafficking and terrorism, the fragile national courts could not withstand the power and terror that
those involved in such activities could bring about, which could destabilize even governments themselves.
An international criminal court could replace national courts on such prosecutions and remove the pressure
from those courts. This idea was not acceptable to the great majority of the states negotiating the statute.”)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 41]. Contrast with the cautionary comments of
Justice Louise Arbour as presented in SCHABAS, supra note 30, at 86-87 (discussing the imbalance
perceived in the prospective function of the complementarity regime, arguing that “the regime would work
in favor of rich, developed countries and against poor countries,” and stating that “[c]ertainly, there is a
danger that the provisions of Article 17 will become a tool for overly harsh assessments of the judicial
machinery in developing countries.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 36].
124

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 42 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 32].
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Kaul, infra note 132, at 60 (noting that the “so-called” safeguard provisions of Article 18 were
“forcefully pushed into the Statute” by the United States delegation and actually served only to weaken the
Court and to create more potential problems) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33].
126

John T. Holmes, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in ROY S. LEE, ET AL., EDS., THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 321, 337 (2001)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 28]. For a general discussion of the issues implied
by Article 17, see id. at 334-37.
127

MAOGOTO, supra note 30, at 241. (noting that “the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over any national of
any State-Party even when in the territory of a non-State Party, as well as over any individuals, regardless
of nationality.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 30]; id. at 242 (noting that the
Rome Statute “may violate national sovereignty by indirectly allowing jurisdiction over the nationals of
States that choose not to become State Parties.”) When viewed in this light, the principle of
complementarity appears even more so to be a protection of national sovereignty, a right to be exercised by
a state to recover jurisdiction at its own discretion. For a discussion of the extent to which an international
tribunal with primacy may weaken state sovereignty, see Maogoto’s analysis of the ICTY’s Blaskic case,
MAOGOTO, supra note 30, at 192-96 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 30]. Contrast
with Louise Arbour and Morten Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach, in
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ADRIAN BOS. 129, 129-140
(Herman A.M. von Hebel, Johan G. Lammers and Jolien Schukking, eds)(1999) (arguing that fears of
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Rome Conference, about 80 percent of the delegations supported a broader form of
jurisdiction than was eventually adopted.128
In the Preparatory Committee, states made proposals on the breadth and definition
of the Court’s jurisdiction. France’s proposal, which did not meet with much approval,
suggested a more detailed delineation of the Court’s reach.129 France’s proposal “would
have made it quite hard for the Court to prove jurisdiction, as it would have had to satisfy
itself that an investigation was ‘manifestly intended to relieve the person concerned of
criminal responsibility,’ or that a conviction or acquittal was the result of national
authorities ‘evading the rule of international law for the manifest purpose’ of relieving the
persons concerned of criminal responsibility (emphasis added). This would have been too
high a threshold.”130
The main argument of states promoting a narrowly defined complementarity
regime is that of protecting state sovereignty. When they speak of the primacy of national
jurisdictions, they do so in terms of protecting a State’s right to prosecute (rather than its
duty to prosecute).131 Limitations were placed upon the power of the ICC in a large part

jurisdictional overreach of the ICC are simply unfounded with regard to the Statute’s jurisdictional regime)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 24].
128

Kaul, infra note 132, at 61 (explaining that the South Korean proposal allowing broader ICC jurisdiction
would have made the Court more effective, allowing prosecution of crimes committed in the civil wars of
non-Party States) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33].
129

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 48 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]. See UN
Doc. A/AC.249/L.3, Draft Statute on the International Criminal Court: Working paper submitted by
France.
130

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 48-49 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].
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Adrian Bos, The Experience of the Preparatory Committee, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 17, 25 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds.,
2001) (noting the paper submitted for discussion by the United Kingdom, “in which was emphasized the
primary right [emphasis added] of states to bring criminals to justice, the need for integrating the concept
of complementarity in all aspects of state cooperation and an exceptional and very restricted role for the
ICC.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33]; MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 50
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to satisfy the sovereignty concerns of the United States, which ultimately voted against
the statute and continues to oppose the Court in its present form.132 Nevertheless, state
sovereignty concerns are legitimate, especially where the integrity of national criminal
justice systems is at issue.133
3. Purpose of the Principle of Complementarity
The ILC’s commentary to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute shows the purpose of the
ICC to be fundamentally linked to the concept of complementarity.134 The commentary
explains that the purpose of the Court is to provide for a fair trial where action by another
jurisdiction would be “unavailable” or “ineffective.”135 The corresponding purpose of
complementarity is to give states the power to limit the Court’s jurisdiction to those

[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]; See also Lee, infra note 137, at 758
(acknowledging the reality that most states wish to preserve their traditional jurisdiction) [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook V at Tab 7]. Contrast with Making the Right Choices, Part I, supra note 44, at
4 (stating that the emphasis of a state’s right to prosecute over its duty to do so is a “fundamental
mischaracterization of the concept of complementarity”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook VI at
Tab 19].
132

Summers, supra note 31, at 88 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 11]; See also
Hans-Peter Kaul, The International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Trigger Mechanism and Relationship to
National Jurisdictions, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE
TO IMPUNITY 121, 62 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001) (noting that the delegation of the United
States won a great number of important concessions at the Rome Conference that had a limiting effect upon
the ICC and claiming that the reason other delegations, specifically Germany, accepted a weaker ICC was
solely for the purpose of ensuring that the United States would ratify the treaty) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33].
133

Leila Sadat Wexler, Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and Complementarity, 25
DENV. J INT’L L. & POL’Y 221, 232 (1997) (considering the concerns of state sovereignty in light of the
predicted inevitability of a supranational character for the ICC) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook V at Tab 13].
134

MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 40 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32].
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ILC Commentary to Article 1, UN Doc. A/49/10, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with
commentaries, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth Session, UN
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No 10, p. 45 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 1]; SADAT,
supra note 59, at 119 (noting that the goal of the framers was to find a “neutral and principled manner to
determine what kind of cases [the ICC] should hear” and that the goal was realized in the determination
that the ICC should hear those cases in which states were either unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 34].
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circumstances, thus weakening the Court136 and preventing political manipulations in the
process.137 The concept has become a foundation of the Rome Statute,138 and it has
arguably created a “complementary transnational legal order for the prosecution of
international crimes.”139
V. THE CONCEPT OF WAIVER BY A STATE PARTY OF THE
REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLEMENTARITY.
A. The Rome Statute’s Silence on the Use of Waiver by States Parties
The Rome Statute does not address the issue of waiver of the complementarity
regime by States Parties.140 The delegates generally agreed that the issue should be left
out of the Statute itself and resolved later in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.141 As

136

Kaul, supra note 132, at 60 (“‘Strengthened complementarity’ sounds positive – in reality it means a
considerable weakening of the Court.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 33].
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Roy S. Lee, An Assessment of the ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 750, 757 (2002) (explaining that
limits on the Court’s jurisdiction are there, in part, to prevent political maneuvering) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook V at Tab 7]; see also Duffy, supra note 117, at 31 (discussing the Rome Statute’s
opportunities to challenge admissibility as a safeguard against unwarranted prosecution) [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook V at Tab 50]. For a discussion of the framing process of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence regarding challenges to jurisdiction or admissibility, see Holmes, supra note 126,
at 344-47 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 28].
138

Cooperation with States, supra note 44, 66 (“Complementarity goes to the heart of the regime of the
Statute. The Diplomatic Conference was unanimous in its view that the ICC should strengthen and
complement, not replace national investigation and prosecutions”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook V at Tab 44].
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For an overview, see James Crawford, The Drafting of the Rome Statute, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE
HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 109, 109-56 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003)
(discussing the drafting of the Rome Statute, with a focus on the underlying issues of institutional structure,
legitimacy, and political acceptance) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 35]. For an
outline of the historical background of the ICC’s development, see KIM, supra note 108, at 6-16
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 26].
140

KIM, supra note 108, at 260 ([T]he Statute including Article 17 does not address the question of the
waiver of the requirements of complementarity. The question of the waiver of the requirements of
complementarity relates to such questions as “if a State chooses not to proceed and prefers that the Court
investigates a case, can it waive the requirements of complementarity?”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook IV at Tab 26]; John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in ROY S. LEE, ED., THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES NEGOTIATIONS RESULTS
41, 78 (1999) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 29].
141

See note 165.
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yet, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not address the issue of waiver.
B. The Duty of Nations to Prosecute under International Law
There is a general agreement that nations have the primary obligation to prosecute
international crimes.142 The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is contained in many
treaties, requiring a State “which has hold of someone who has committed a crime of
international concern either to extradite the offender to another State which is prepared to
try him or else to take steps to have him prosecuted before its own courts.”143 Notably, if
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MISKOWIAK, supra note 44, at 40 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 32]; compare
Michael P. Scharf and Nigel Rodley, International Law Principles on Accountability, in POST CONFLICT
JUSTICE 89, 91 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed.)(2002) (stating that there may be a legal obligation to prosecute
regardless of the politics of the situation) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 20].
Compare the concept of complicity in Andrew Clapham, Issues of Complexity, Complicity and
Complementarity, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 30, 59-60 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003) (acknowledging a general expectation “on all authorities that
they should take up human rights cases with the authorities” and that “there is something culpable about
failing to exercise influence in such circumstances.”)(claiming that states have an unwritten duty to all
members of the international community to protect against violent attacks on human rights) [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 35]. Compare concepts of state responsibility and failure to act in M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 95-99 (1987) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 18]; Abram
Chayes and Anne-Marie Slaughter, The ICC and the Future of the Global Legal System, in THE UNITED
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 237, 240 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds.,
2000)(“The existence of exclusive domestic jurisdiction is now increasingly conditional on conformity with
international rules and principles, especially human rights norms”) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook IV at Tab 37]; CASSESE, infra note 162, at 302 (“[I]t cannot be denied that at least with regard to
the most odious international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity, there exists a general
obligation of international co-operation for their prevention and punishment.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook III at Tab 22].
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M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI AND EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR
PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1995) [hereinafter referred to as Aut Dedere Aut Judicare]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 17]. See also CASSESE, infra note 162, at 302
(“[O]ne could argue that in those areas where treaties provide for such an obligation, a corresponding
customary rule may have emerged or be in the process of evolving. Clearly, as soon as it may be proved
that customary rules have formed, they will reinforce for all the contracting parties the obligations to the
same effect laid down in the aforementioned Conventions.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
III at Tab 22]; MAOGOTO, supra note 30, at 187 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at 30]. For
an historical overview, see KIM, supra note 108, at 6-16 (tracing the development of international tribunals
in the context of world events) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 26]. For a general
discussion of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO
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a state would shield a person accused of a political offense, there is growing international
pressure on that state to prosecute.144
The ICC is presented as a court that should not serve as a substitute “for
procedures that national courts are legally obliged to undertake on their own.”145 The
Rome Statute anticipates, as evidenced by the complementarity regime, that national
courts will bear the larger part of the burden of combating impunity and that the ICC will
become involved only where states are unwilling or genuinely unable to act themselves,
remembering that “it cannot be expected that the ICC will have the resources to try more
than a very limited number of cases.”146
Because effective prosecution is a key goal, states wishing to exercise their right
to prosecute international crimes under the principle of complementarity must have
legislation in place to that effect.147 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the principle of
complementarity, as contemplated in general international criminal law, does not directly
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 190 (1987) (providing

commentary to Draft International Criminal Code Part III
Article IV: Aut Dedere Aut Judicare) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III at Tab 18]. See
generally, Colleen Enache-Brown, Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty: The Obligation of Aut Dedere
Aut Judicare in International Law 43 MCGILL L.J. 613 (1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
V at Tab 1].
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GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, SURRENDERING TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS:
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES (2002) 312-47 (“there is a growing trend in international law
to give effect to the maxim aut dedere aut judicare, implying that if a State wishes to shield someone from
extradition on the basis of the political offense exception, it should, as Bassiouni notes, assume the duty to
prosecute.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook IV at Tab 27]. However, this principle is not
established as a mandatory rule. See note 165.
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Danner, supra note 38, at 527 n. 129 (“In order to take advantage of the complementarity regime,
however, states must enact domestic legislation allowing them to investigate and prosecute the crimes
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Court on investigative and evidentiary matters.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook V at Tab 49].
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jurisdiction.
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presuppose a state’s duty to prosecute international crimes.148
The Rome Statute itself “does not require States to prosecute individuals
suspected of committing crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.”149 This is true even
though the preamble calls this a duty.150 The incentive for States themselves to prosecute
is largely to maintain their integrity, for “[i]t is to be hoped that States will be
embarrassed when the Court attempts to exercise jurisdiction under the principle of
complementarity.”151
State responsibility is urged as a general rule. For example, when the ICTY was
established in 1993, the national courts of the region were urged by the U.N. SecretaryGeneral to prosecute the alleged perpetrators despite the primacy of the tribunal.152
Furthermore, the president of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, has stressed an obligation of
nations, under customary law, to prosecute serious offenses or to extradite the accused
persons to a country that will exercise jurisdiction.153 Cassese pointed out that the ICTY
(which does have primary jurisdiction) is simply incapable of trying every crime and thus
that national prosecutions should provide much needed assistance by shouldering part of
148
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prosecute or to extradite, because its goal is accountability, then surely the substantive and procedural
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the case load.154 Likewise, if not more so, the ICC it subject to substantial budget
constraints.155
Representatives of many nations have given their opinions on the matter. Some
intend that the ICC, in principle, should not be involved until there is no other option.156
There are a number of reasons why the primacy of national jurisdiction and a narrowly
defined complementarity regime are favorable. First, it is important that States recognize
their duty to prosecute crimes under international law.157 Second, national trials are less
expensive, less complicated due to familiarity with local rules and spoken languages, and
less traumatizing for the accused.158 Third, it is likely that the availability of witnesses
and evidence will be better for national courts.159 Fourth, national prosecution may have a
greater deterrent effect due to local media coverage and the closer proximity of the case
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to the public.160
However, there are a number of counterarguments supporting ICC involvement.
The existence of a strong international court will strike a crucial blow to impunity.161
Also, it will be a large incentive for States to meet their duty to prosecute international
crimes;162 thus, where a state decides not to prosecute, it is unlikely to be the result of an
underdeveloped or lax sense of duty.163 Furthermore, it is possible that an international
body might better assure the humane treatment of the accused164 and better protect
against sham prosecutions.165
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C. The Acceptability of Waiver
The concept of waiver received passing attention in the 1994 ILC Draft Statute
and was disregarded entirely at the Rome Conference.166 It was generally believed that
the issue should be addressed not in the Rome Statute itself but in the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence.167 It follows, arguably, that the acceptability of waiver was therefore
favorable as a general principle, although the details were to be worked out procedurally
and approved by the Assembly of States Parties at a later date.168 Although the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence do not as yet address the issue, there has been no official
rejection of waiver, and the rules of jurisdiction and admissibility impliedly allow it.
Bruce Broomhall notes that the ICC may find a case admissible where a State
prefers that the ICC exercise its jurisdiction,169 in line with the inadmissibility
requirements of Article 17. Furthermore, international criminal law recognizes the
transfer of criminal proceedings based on a theory that the transferee represents the best
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chance for the administration of justice.170
In the present circumstances regarding Uganda and DRC, the ICC may be
vulnerable to accusations of politicized prosecution.171 The situations in Uganda and
DRC should thus be carefully examined. The local political situation should be a factor
taken into account.172 Commentators urge that all criminal prosecutions be conducted
with an acute sensitivity to the conditions within a state; otherwise, the overall effect of
judicial intervention may be to incite more violence.173
Because political implications are present in any prosecution, it is possible that
political reasons for prosecution should be evaluated with regard to whether or not they
are “inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”174
170
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Commentators suggest that the fact that “the ICC allows various points of entry for
politics may actually facilitate the attainment of even the most sacred of the ICC’s
mandates – the promotion of retribution and reconciliation in ways that preserve order
and stability in the international community.”175
D. The Consequences of Waiver
The first possible consequence of waiver is a total bypass of the complementarity
mechanism,176 resulting in a lack of state challenge to ICC jurisdiction. Thus, the
credibility of the Court is arguably heightened by a state’s willingness to waive the
complementarity requirements. This assumption might be undercut, however, if it
becomes obvious that the Court is in fact swamped with complaints and will obviously
not be able to attend to the case for some time, if at all. Waiver must not be a means by
which a nation delays prosecution or seeks to deny it completely. An objection by an
individual who stands accused thus hinges on the legitimacy of the ICC’s establishment
of jurisdiction, focusing on the legitimacy of the state referral itself and the state’s
questionable ability to fully and fairly prosecute.
VI. CONCLUSION
The final delineation of the principle of complementarity is set forth in the Rome
Statute as an assurance that the International Criminal Court will be a court of last resort.
The original concept, allowing for a broader, more concurrent form of jurisdiction for the
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Court, was narrowed mainly as a result of the fears of negotiators at Rome that the ICC
might pose a threat to state sovereignty and that the ICC might be an easy way for states
to assault each other politically. The principle of complementarity, in its present form, is
therefore intended to protect the primacy of national jurisdictions over ICC jurisdiction.
Waiver of the right to prosecute by Uganda and DRC does not appear to violate
the principle of complementarity. The situations presented by both states are of a serious
nature, warranting prosecution. The situations were referred directly by states having
both territorial and national jurisdiction, giving the ICC jurisdiction without the express
need to further determine admissibility. Furthermore, the Rome Statute does not impose a
duty to prosecute upon Uganda and DRC. Neither state’s referral is an action that is
inconsistent with a desire to bring about justice, and both states’ judicial systems are
seriously impaired. Given such factors, waiver of the right to prosecute is most likely
acceptable.177 Exercise of ICC jurisdiction would not be likely to have such consequences
as would impair the purpose of the ICC or its principle of complementarity.
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